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NOTES
QUALITY OF LIFE-AT WHAT PRICE?:
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO LAWS
ADVERSELY IMPACTING THE HOMELESS
Communities nationwide are rethinking their approach to com-
bating crime.' Citizens overwhelmed by crime have demanded
that the federal government assist them in their struggle to re-
claim city streets and neighborhoods.2 In response to the public's
1 See George L. Kelling, Acquiring a Taste for Order: The Community and Police, 33
CRIME AND DELjNQ. 90, 90 (1987). The author notes that the importance of maintaining
order in society is grounded in empirical evidence indicating that people's fears result more
from disorder than the actual commission of crime. Id. at 92-93. Disorder is described as "a
condition [that] is offensive in its violation of local expectations for normalcy and peace in a
community." Id. at 95; see also Elish King, Fear Lives in Homes, Study Says Violence Seen
Moving Into Safe Communities, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1994, at M1. The study indicated that
people would feel safer if violent criminals served tougher prison terms, poverty were re-
duced, drug and alcohol abuse lessened, and harsher gun control legislation was passed.
Id.; Courtland Milloy, The Shot Heard 'Round Sammy's, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1993, at B1.
Local businesses in metropolitan areas facing the grim realities of crime, arm themselves
with weapons to fight crime. Id.
2 See Ann Devroy, President Says Congress is Too Slow on Crime Bill, WASH. POST, Feb.
16, 1994, at A7. The Clinton administration's "comprehensive framework," includes crime
legislation and a "concerted, disciplined approach" integrating the efforts of all federal
agencies in addressing the broader issues of family and community. Id.; Jonathan P. Hicks,
New York City Exceeds Limit on Overtime, N.Y. TnEs, Aug. 9, 1994, at B1. The New York
Police Department had made a priority of arresting people violating quality of life offenses.
Id.; What's in the New Crime Bill?, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 14, 1994, at 11A (listing law en-
forcement and crime prevention provisions benefiting state and local governments in new
crime bill signed into law by President Clinton). See generally Marc C. Cozzolino, Note,
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outcry, Congress reacted with legislation including the federal
crime bill 3 and gun control laws.4 Citizens hope federal legislation
will benefit their neighborhoods by providing safer streets, parks,
schools, and a greater police presence. 5 These federal endeavors
bolster community efforts to combat crime by providing funding
for, and emphasizing the enforcement of, laws on the local level.6
The public's call for ways to halt the ever-increasing cycle of so-
cial disorder has spurred a recent resurgence in "quality-of-life"
laws.v Politicians and lawmakers center their campaigns around
Gun Control: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 245,
245 (1992) (discussing debates over gun control by legislature and general public).
3 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, 103rd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994) (enacted); Congress Should Focus on Community Solutions, DETROr FREE
PREss, Sept. 17, 1993, at 10A. The assertion was that the federal government's role in
fighting crime and improving the quality of life in communities infested with crime is
through funding which will positively impact communities by augmenting local policing
efforts. Id.; see also Steven Thomma, $33 Billion Crime Bill Set for Final Vote, PimA. IN-
QUIRER, July 29, 1994, at Al. The majority of the money allocated in the federal crime bill
will go to state and local law enforcement efforts to fight crime. Id. Spending on preventive
social programs was also included in the bill because, according to President Clinton, "we
cannot jail our way out of this crisis." Id. Other provisions for the crime bill include: fund-
ing for an increase in all levels of law enforcement, specific grants for local community
policing programs, money for more prisons, a ban on certain types of assault weapons, and
the imposition of the death penalty for more federal crimes. Id.
4 See Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ("Brady Bill"), 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
Under the Brady Bill, before a handgun dealer can transfer a gun to a buyer, the dealer
must either wait for five days to elapse or for the approval of a chief law enforcement of-
ficer. Id.; cf Daniel D. Polsby, The False Promise of Gun Control, ATLANTc MoNTLY, Mar.
1994, at 62. The author discussed how gun control laws may save some lives, but are not
effective in controlling the flow of guns to citizens who rely on them as a defense strategy
for survival. Id.
5 See What's in the New Crime Law, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 1994, at All. The crime bill,
signed into law by President Clinton, contains provisions for increased funding for law en-
forcement and crime prevention programs to address crime and disorder problems. Id.
6 See H.R. REP. No. 103-324, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994) (discussing federal crime bill
provisions affecting local law enforcement efforts); see also Thomma, supra note 3, at Al
and accompanying text (discussing spending provisions of federal crime bill affecting fed-
eral, state, and local law enforcement efforts). See generally Andrew J. McClurg, The Rheto-
ric of Gun Control, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 53, 53 (1992) (discussing sociological motivation for
gun control legislation); see infra note 7 (discussing relationship between disorder and
crime).
7 See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTmc MONTHLY, Mar.
1982, at 29. The authors discussed how increased crime and fear are the inevitable results
of social disorder. Id. at 31. They maintained that society perceives a neighborhood evi-
dencing broken windows, graffiti, abandoned property, deterioration of family structure,
and the presence of youth gangs, drug-dealers, prostitutes, and panhandlers as a public
threat to society precisely because these characteristics indicate that disorder has infil-
trated the community. Id. at 32-33; see also Ronald Brownstein, Taming the Mean Streets,
LA. Tms, May 4, 1994, at Al. Advocates of this new agenda for social order stress the
rights of the community to demand certain minimum standards of behavior, and argue that
disorder is not only a symptom but a cause of social distress. Id. Maintaining urban order
and controlling threatening street behavior is seen as essential to stop the flight of the
middle class from cities. Id. The efforts to reclaim public spaces are based on the theory
that disorderly conduct signals a breakdown in social and law enforcement controls, and
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promises of law enforcement programs intended to attack quality-
of-life violations.8 These efforts have ranged from the enforcement
of noncontroversial ordinances regulating such conduct as litter-
ing and excessive noisemaking, 9 to regulations that essentially
"criminalize" the often involuntary state of homelessness. 10 The
thus leads to more serious criminal offenses. Id.; Devroy, supra note 2, at A7 (discussing
how proponents of anticrime legislation have recognized that polls indicate crime as lead-
ing concern among Americans); Everybody's Problem: How Cities Around the Country Are
Dealing with the Homeless, S.F. CHRON., July 5, 1992, at 10 [hereinafter Everybody's Prob-
lem]. Politicians have responded to the frustration of citizens who are "simply fed up" with
the deterioration of urban life by emphasizing quality of life issues in their campaigns. Id.
A recent poll by Columbia University which surveyed 1507 adults nationwide indicated
that public opinion supported the implementation of more aggressive police tactics to im-
prove the quality of life in public spaces. Id.
8 See Ester B. Fein, The 1994 Campaign Issues; Facing Social Problems, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 1, 1994, at B4. The candidates in New York's gubernatorial campaign, Mario Cuomo
and George Pataki, focus on the issue of crime. Id.; James L. Tyson, Cities Crack Down on
Homeless, CmUSTLAN Sc. MoNrrOR, Jan. 21, 1994, at 4. San Francisco has instituted a
comprehensive law enforcement program called Matrix Quality of Life Enforcement. Id.
Under this program, San Francisco police have aggressively enforced a variety of ordi-
nances prohibiting panhandling, obstructing sidewalks, sleeping in parks, and other qual-
ity of life offenses. Id.; see also Brownstein, supra note 7, at Al. In New York City, Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani and Police Commissioner, William J. Bratton, have devised a law en-
forcement program which targets quality of life violations. Id. Programs such as New
York's and San Francisco's are representative of steps advocated by an informal coalition of
law enforcement officials and urban planners seeking to reduce disorder and incivility. Id.
9 See Brownstein, supra note 7, at Al. Increased enforcement of ordinances controlling
truancy, littering, drinking alcohol, urinating in public, making too much noise, and illegal
street vending have met little or no controversy. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.5 (Mc-
Kinney 1988) (prohibiting littering on railroad property); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 145.60 (McKin-
ney 1988) (prohibiting graffiti); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220-221 (regulating drug-related activi-
ties); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (McKinney 1988) (loitering for purposes of engaging in
prostitution); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20(7) (McKinney 1988) (prohibiting urinating in pub-
lic); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.46 (McKinney 1988) (pi-ohibiting criminal nuisance in first de-
gree as related to drug dealing); NEW YoRic, N.Y., ADhMN. CODE ch. 1, § 10-117 (1994)
(prohibiting graffiti); NEw YoRic, N.Y., ADmne. CODE ch. 1, § 10-125 (1994) (prohibiting
drinking in public); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADmiN. CODE ch. 2, § 10-201 (1994) (prohibiting un-
lawful sale or possession of controlled substances); NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMN. CODE ch. 1,
§ 16-118 (1994) (prohibiting littering); NEw YoRK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 24-218 (1994)
(prohibiting making excessive noise).
10 Tyson, supra note 8, at 4. Nationwide, cities are increasingly enacting or strictly en-
forcing regulations which prohibit persons from lying or sleeping on public spaces. Id. Vio-
lators are subject to arrest, fines and incarceration. Id. The article quotes a recent report by
the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty in Washington, D.C., reporting that
"[i]nstead of attacking the problem of homelessness, some cities are now attacking home-
less people themselves." Id.; see, e.g., ARIZ. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2905(A)(3) (1989) (prohib-
iting loitering for purpose of begging); PHOENiX, Aiz., Crry CODE § 23-48.01 (1981); SAN
FRANCisco, CAL., PARK CODE § 3.13 (1988); MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-63 (1990); ST. PETERS-
BURG, FLA. ORDinANcE § 25.57 (1973) (prohibiting sleeping or lying in public spaces); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40:48-1(7) (West 1963) (granting every municipality authority to punish beg-
ging and prevent loitering); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20(5) (McKinney 1993) (prohibiting dis-
orderly conduct); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35 (McKinney 1993) (prohibiting loitering); N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1993) (prohibiting begging); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35(7)
(McKinney 1993) (prohibiting sleeping in any transportation facility); SEATTLE, WASH.
MUN. CODE § a.12.015(B) (1987) (prohibiting aggressive begging); see also Young v. New
York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 354 n.23-26 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 903 F.2d 146 (2d
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enactment and aggressive enforcement of these laws have
prompted heated exchanges and court battles11 between propo-
nents of the laws and advocates for those who will be most im-
pacted by such regulations: the homeless, young people, and
minorities.12
Quality-of-life laws that proscribe loitering, begging, and sleep-
ing outdoors may adversely impact one group in particular, the
homeless.1 3 The face of homelessness has changed from the stere-
otypically depicted alcoholic, drug addict, or mentally ill individ-
ual to now encompass entire families made homeless by adverse
economic conditions. 14 Homeless persons are often forced to sleep
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990) (outlining 25 states nationwide that have statutes
ranging from regulating begging to outright prohibition).
11 See Johnson v. City of Dallas, No. CIV.A.3:94-CV-991-X, 1994 WL 447283, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 18, 1994) (examining constitutionality of ordinances allegedly enforced for pur-
pose of removing homeless from public view); Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp.
843, 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (discussing action on behalf of class of homeless adversely im-
pacted by San Francisco's Matrix Quality of Life Program); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810
F. Supp. 1551, 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (examining constitutional challenges brought by class
of homeless against City of Miami for custom, policy, and practice of arresting, harassing,
and interfering with homeless for performing life-sustaining activities in public spaces).
12 See Brownstein, supra note 7, at Al. A new urban policy movement which has cities
attempting to reclaim besieged areas by enforcing quality of life laws has raised complex
questions of rights, responsibilities, and fairness. Id. Communities are struggling with
striking a balance between individual civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and freedom
of movement, against the rights of communities to enjoy certain minimum standards of
behavior that are necessary to preserve a well-ordered community. Id. Civil rights advo-
cates maintain that these laws fall disproportionately and discriminatorily on the young,
the poor, and the nonwhite. Id.; Tyson, supra note 8, at 4. Cities nationwide are in the
process of "criminalizing" homelessness by enacting or strictly enforcing ordinances meant
to reclaim public spaces through punitive measures. Id. Laws directed at the homeless
prohibit people from sleeping, aggressively begging, and even sitting on public property.
Id.; see also Haywood Burns, New York Forum About Justice: Johannesburg On the Hud-
son?, N.Y. NEwSDAY, July 13, 1994, at A28. The author voiced concerns that enforcement of
quality of life laws, rooted in social policy based on anger and fear, will disproportionately
impact youth, the poor, and minorities. Id.
13 See Rick Bragg, Sleepless in Central Park, N.Y. TIsS, July 24, 1994, at 33. In New
York City, police order homeless from Central Park after dark. Id. Crimes involving the
homeless as both victims and perpetrators have motivated the police to clear the park of
homeless camps. Id. Mary Brosnahan, Executive Director of New York's Coalition for the
Homeless, stated her concern that "homeless people seem to be the last group not afforded
equal protection under the law." Id. But see AicE S. BAUM & DONALD W. BURNs, A NATION
!N DENLAL 15 (1993) (discussing how high population of homeless families in New York City
is not necessarily representative of homeless population nationwide).
14 See Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11472 (1988).
Congress defined a homeless individual to be "an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and
adequate nighttime residence." Id. § 11302(a). Additionally, the congressional definition of
a homeless person includes individuals whose primary nighttime residence is a public or
private temporary shelter, or place not designated for accommodation of individuals. Id.;
see also Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1558-59. Expert testimony asserted that homelessness is
increasingly caused by factors beyond an individual's control. Id. Adverse economic condi-
tions such as joblessness and lack of low-income housing are factors contributing to home-
lessness. Id. Additionally, persons are being born into homelessness. Id.; Paul Ades, Coin-
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and remain outdoors, and typically must beg to obtain food, cloth-
ing, transportation, and medical care. 15 Laws aimed at improving
the quality of life in communities often directly affect the home-
less, and implicate constitutional protections such as due pro-
cess, 16 equal protection, 17 freedom of expression,' freedom of
movement,' 9 and the prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.20 In order to evaluate the constitutionality of such laws,
it is crucial to analyze the competing interests at stake, including
those of the government, the general public, and the offenders. 2 '
Part One of this Note addresses several constitutional claims
brought by advocates representing homeless people who have
been adversely impacted by legislation that was specifically in-
tended to improve the quality of life in communities nationwide.
Throughout Part One, this Note will highlight leading cases on
the rights of the homeless in order to illustrate the diverse and
inconsistent judicial analyses applied in evaluating the various
constitutional challenges. Part Two examines the issue of
whether the homeless, as a subset of the poor, exhibit the tradi-
tional indicia of suspectness, calling for heightened constitutional
protection. The Conclusion discusses how courts recognize the is-
sue of potential municipal liability based on the enactment and
enforcement of legislation that adversely impacts the homeless by
ment, The Unconstitutionality of "Antihomeless" Laws: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in
Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L. REv. 595, 601 (1989).
The author noted that, increasingly, the ranks of the homeless are made up of individuals
not suffering from mental illness or drug and alcohol addiction, rather, many are physically
handicapped, elderly, and female-headed families. Id.; Rob Polmer, Camp Misery, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Oct. 9, 1994, at A7 (reporting New York City shelter system swelled with
thousands of families lacking shelter).
15 See infra note 22 (discussing necessary life-sustaining activities of homeless).
16 See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (discussing due process challenges to
antihomeless legislation).
17 See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection challenges
brought on behalf of homeless persons).
is See infra notes 24-28, 42-48, and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment
protection of begging as expressive conduct).
19 See infra notes 100-10 and accompanying text (discussing anti-sleeping regulations as
violative of fundamental right to travel); see also Ades, supra note 14, at 605-23 (arguing
that ordinances prohibiting outdoor sleeping in all public areas unconstitutionally burden
fundamental right to travel).
20 See infra notes 64-74, 80-91, and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Amendment
challenges to regulations banning necessary life-sustaining public activities of homeless
persons). See generally Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical
Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons From American Cities, 66 Tut. L.
REv. 631, 631 (1992) (discussing constitutional challenges to homeless arrests).
21 See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing competing interests of par-
ties involved in litigation resulting from legislation adversely impacting homeless).
1994]
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denying them constitutional protection. Finally, the Note will
conclude that the homeless, as a group, evidence many of the
traditional indicia of suspectness, entitling them to treatment as a
suspect or quasi-suspect class.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
HOMELESSNESS
A. Begging as Expressive Conduct
Many homeless persons subsist on begging alone. 22 The estab-
lished view of the legal system treats personal begging as a nui-
sance subject to extensive governmental control.23 Increasingly,
the poor and the homeless are challenging ordinances prohibiting
begging on the grounds that they are a violation of their constitu-
tional right to free speech under state and federal constitutions.24
22 See Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(defining "needy person" as someone who must beg to pay for life's necessities: food, shelter,
clothing, medical care, and transportation), aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); Charles F.
Knapp, Comment, Statutory Restriction of Panhandling in Light of Young v. New York
City Transit: Are States Begging Out of First Amendment Proscriptions?, 76 IOWA L. REV.
405, 406 (1991) (recognizing begging or panhandling as necessary activity of homeless
persons).
23 See Panhandling Control Act, 1993 D.C. Stat. 54. The Washington D.C. law defined
aggressive begging in part as "approaching, speaking to, or following a person in a manner
as would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm or the commission of a criminal act
upon the person, or upon property in the person's immediate possession." Id.; see also Paul
G. Chevigny, Begging and the First Amendment: Young v. New York City Transit Author-
ity, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 525, 526 (1991). The traditional judicial stance towards personal
begging is that it is a "nuisance which the government had full power to control." Id.; see
also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (stating
"certain methods of expression may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance" and there-
fore do not warrant protection); ACORN v. St. Louis County, 930 F.2d 591, 597 (8th Cir.
1991) (upholding ordinance prohibiting solicitation of motorists on roadways by political
organization); Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154-56 (2d Cir.) (char-
acterizing personal begging as attempt by beggars to "exact money from those whom they
accost"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990). The court distinguished between solicitation by
organized charities, which served the public's interests in communicating information, and
personal begging which "amounts to nothing less than a menace to the common good." Id.
at 156; ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1986) (denying First
Amendment protection to political organization soliciting funds from motorists stopped at
intersections); see also infra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing permissible solici-
tation by organized charities).
24 See Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Laws Regulating Begging, Panhandling, or Simi-
lar Activity by Poor or Homeless Persons, 7 A.L.R.5TH 455, 462-63 (1992). The author dis-
cussed how the swelling numbers of homeless persons lead to a growing desire by local
governments to push the problems of homelessness out of the public's view. Id. With state
and local governments instituting or reinstating laws prohibiting begging, the legality of
these laws are increasingly being challenged as unconstitutional restrictions of free speech.
Id.
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Several state courts have held that begging does not constitute
protected speech.25 Typically, in refusing to extend First Amend-
ment protection to begging, courts determine that begging does
not necessarily bear a relationship to the communication of infor-
mation.26 In 1990, the federal courts addressed the conflict in
Young v. New York City Transit Authority,27 when a divided Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, and held that beg-
ging in New York City's subway system was not protected by the
First Amendment.28
In Roulette v. City of Seattle,29 a coalition of homeless individu-
als and advocacy organizations brought an action challenging an
ordinance that prohibited "aggressive begging," which was defined
as begging in a manner so as to compel fear in those solicited.3 0
The court addressed the constitutionality of the ordinance prohib-
iting "aggressive begging."3 ' The ordinance explicitly prohibited
begging with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or compel people
to offer money out of fear for their safety.32 The court recognized
an individual's First Amendment rights to free speech and peace-
ful begging, while differentiating between solicitations that are
protected as First Amendment activity and those that constitute
25 See People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 489 (App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1994)
(citing Ulmer v. Municipal Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Ct. App. 1976) in finding that begging
does not necessarily bear a relationship to First Amendment's protection of freedom to
speak, write, print, or distribute information or opinion); City of Seattle v. Webster, 802
P.2d 1333, 1338-39 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (holding ordinance did not violate First Amend-
ment by making it unlawful for beggars and others to intentionally obstruct pedestrian or
vehicular traffic), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 908 (1991).
26 See Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 489. The Zimmerman court noted that the mere
fact that begging may be performed by speech does not by itself justify First Amendment
protection. Id.
27 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
28 See Young, 903 F.2d at 147-48. The Second Circuit held that a regulation prohibiting
begging in the New York subway system did not violate the First Amendment. Id. The
Court of Appeals considered begging to be "expressive conduct" rather than "speech." Id. at
153. Citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974), the court recognized that
expressive conduct is protected by the First Amendment if such conduct is intended to con-
vey a "particularized message," but decided that "begging is not inseparably intertwined
with a particularized message," and is not deserving of constitutional protection. 903 F.2d
at 153-54.
29 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
30 See SEAtrLE, WAsH. MuN. CODE § 12A.12.015(AX1) (1987). This section prohibits beg-
ging with the "intent to intimidate." Id.; see also SEArrLE, WASH. MUN. CODE
§ 12A.12.015(A)(2) (1987). The regulation defines intimidate as conduct which "would make
a reasonable person fearful or feel compelled." Id.
31 Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1451.
32 Id. at 1452.
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threats of imminent physical harm, which are unprotected.33 The
court upheld the statute, but invalidated a section of the ordi-
nance which prescribed circumstances to be considered in deter-
mining a beggar's intent as unconstitutionally overbroad and
vague. 4 According to the court, the circumstances section did not
define with sufficient specificity the particular circumstances that
were prohibited by law.35
Some courts, however, have recognized begging or panhandling
as a right to solicit contributions that is worthy of protection as
"expressive conduct" under the First Amendment.36 An action is
deemed to be constitutionally protected expressive conduct when
there exists "an intent to convey a particularized message" and it
is likely that those viewing the action would understand the
message meant to be conveyed.37
The plaintiffs in Loper v. New York City Police Department3"
were members of a class of "needy persons" who begged in city
33 Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1452. The court distinguished Loper v. New York City Police
Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993), which prohibited begging throughout New York City
from the ordinance at issue which contained a mens rea element of intent. Roulette, 850 F.
Supp. at 1452; see also supra note 30 (discussing intent element of Seattle's aggressive
begging ordinance).
34 Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1454. The court recognized that the circumstances section in
the Seattle antibegging ordinance was initially intended to assist citizens, law enforce-
ment, and judiciaries in determining whether or not the ordinance was violated. Id. How-
ever, some of the circumstances outlined in the ordinance described protected speech and
did not define the circumstances with specificity. Id.
35 Id.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides that "[c]ongress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech." Id.; see also Loper v. New York City Police Dep't,
802 F. Supp. 1029, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). The Loper court
recognized that the government had a valid interest in "preserving public order" and pro-
tecting and promoting the interests of audiences and bystanders, but also found begging to
be "conduct with an expressive component entitled to some First Amendment protection."
Id.; Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating that beggars have
First Amendment freedom to speak in public), aff'd, No. 92-15447, 1994 WL 593074, (9th
Cir. Oct. 31, 1994); C.C.B. v. State of Florida, 458 So. 2d 47, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(invalidating Jacksonville ordinance proscribing begging as unconstitutional infringement
of right to free speech); LAURENCE H. TRIE, AuEmCAN CONSTrrtrONAL LAw § 12-7, at 829
(2d ed. 1988) (reasoning that soliciting contributions is activity "intertwined with speech"
raising First Amendment issues). See generally Cynthia R. Mabry, Brother Can You Spare
Some Change-And Your Privacy Too?: Avoiding a Fatal Collision Between Public Interests
and Beggars' First Amendment Rights, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 309, 309 (1994) (discussing vari-
ous assessments by courts of beggars' right to beg).
37 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (articulating Supreme Court's
criteria for determining whether particular conduct is deserving of First Amendment
protection).
8 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
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streets and parks.3 9 They challenged a New York State statute
prohibiting loitering for the purposes of begging.40 Although the
plaintiffs had never been arrested or received a summons for beg-
ging, the court found that they had standing to bring a First
Amendment challenge because police relied on the statute to order
beggars to "move along. "41
In assessing the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim, the court
balanced the competing interests of the beggars,42 the interests of
those being directly solicited for money,4 3 the general public's in-
terests,44 and the unifying interest of the government in protect-
ing and promoting all of these competing interests. 45 Though the
court recognized that the government has a strong interest in im-
proving the quality of life by restoring public order,46 the court
asserted that in attempting to remove peaceful beggars from the
public's view, the government was not confronting the base causes
of homelessness.47 The court held that the interests of beggars
39 Id. at 1033. The Loper court defined needy persons as "someone who, because of pov-
erty, is unable to pay for the necessities of life, such as food, shelter, clothing, medical care,
and transportation." Id.
40 Id. at 1032. The New York Penal Law provides that "[a] person is guilty of loitering
when he... [Il]oiters, remains, or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of begging
.... " N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1993). Id.
41 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1035. The court stressed that even though only very few "peace-
ful begging" arrests had been made, evidence existed that police asked beggars to "move
along," establishing actual imminent threat of injury. Id.
42 See id. at 1042. The beggar has an interest in soliciting funds and in sending out a
social message calling his or her plight to the attention of the public. Id.
43 See Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). The Loper opinion also listed the interests of the beggar's
specific audience, those being directly solicited by the beggars, as primarily the interest in
freely obtaining information. Id. Additionally, members of the audience have an interest in
'not being defrauded .... in being informed about social conditions, and in having one's
personal privacy respected." Id.
44 Id. at 1045. The Loper court recognized the general public's interests as not only en-
compassing the availability of information, but also protecting the public order and protect-
ing against fraud. Id.
45 Id. at 1045. The opinion noted that the government's interest is all-encompassing in
that it includes protecting and promoting the legitimate interests of beggars, their audi-
ences, and the general public. Id.
46 Id. at 1046. Professor Kelling's "Broken Windows" theory, which has been adopted by
New York City, is directed at quality of life concerns and the ability of society to ban those
things it finds offensive. Id. Kelling maintained that indicia of disorder such as the home-
less and panhandlers, increase the public's "perception of fear" by indicating that "crime is
more frequent and no one is in charge." Id. Based on this, the City claims that the police
are justified in enforcing the antibegging statute in an attempt to reestablish order. Id.; see
also supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing sociological theories used to explain
social disorder).
47 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1046. A beggar, solely by being impoverished, does not repre-
sent a threat to society. Id. By criminalizing a peaceful beggar's activity in an effort to
remove the message of disorder that begging sends to society, the city is avoiding the base
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and the message begging sends to the public prevails over the
city's interest in preserving public order.48
Commonly, an ordinance will ban begging by an individual, but
allow for solicitation by organized charities.4 9 Courts may refuse
to recognize begging as a protected activity by either declining to
equate personal begging with solicitation by organized charities,
which has been afforded strong protection by the Supreme
Court, 0 or by treating begging as "incidental speech" that is not
necessarily communicative of views and ideas.51 Even where beg-
ging has been recognized by the courts as expressive conduct, it
cause of begging and homelessness and pretending the problem does not exist. Id.; cf Ades,
supra note 14, at 599-601 (outlining major causes of homelessness such as deinstitutional-
ization of mentally ill, lack of low income housing, chronic unemployment, and cutbacks in
social welfare).
48 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1047 (holding N. Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1) unconstitutional
under First Amendment of United States Constitution).
49 See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 1990). In
prohibiting begging on the subways, the New York Transit Authority relied on an ordi-
nance which exempted certain classes of organized charities and solicitations for religious
or political purposes. Id.; see also Nancy A. Miich, Compassion Fatigue and the First
Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 255, 265
(1994) (recognizing nationwide antibegging statutes typically prohibit individual begging
while allowing solicitation by organized charities).
50 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2704
(1992) (per curiam). The Court heard a challenge to New York Port Authority's regulations
banning the solicitation of funds and distribution of literature within the area's airports.
Id. Though the Court upheld a ban on solicitation in airports, it permitted distribution of
pamphlets, effectively extending First Amendment protection to solicitation by the organ-
ized charity. Id. at 2709; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
799 (1985) (deciding literature from political advocacy group was protected as charitable
solicitation, although "not equally permissible in all places at all times"); Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). The Supreme Court invalidated a
statute which attempted to regulate solicitation by an organized charity. Id. at 639. The
Court recognized the interrelationship between the act of solicitation and forms of expres-
sing views and ideas afforded First Amendment protection Id. at 635-39.
51 See Young, 903 F.2d at 152-53 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)). The
court noted that the Supreme Court has refused to accept all conduct as analogous to
"speech" simply based upon the actor's intent to convey an idea. Id. In distinguishing com-
munity service through charities from personal begging, the Second Circuit questioned
whether begging equaled communication in the degree necessary to afford constitutional
protection. Id. at 153; see also Robert Tier, Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public
Spaces: A Constitutional Approach to Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REv. 285, 322 (1993).
The author asserted that a beggar's objective in begging is to obtain money, not to express
some political or economic idea. Id. Accordingly, begging does not communicate anything
about a beggar's state of mind sufficient to come within "the freedom of speech" protections
of the First Amendment. Id. at 322-24. The author, though concluding that begging is not
protected speech, recognized that begging may be deemed to have expressive elements, and
that any regulations must be directed at the nonexpressive components of begging. Id. at
324. But see Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Comment, Begging to Differ: The First
Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARv. L. REv. 896, 908-09 (1991). The authors ar-
gued that begging is clearly not unprotected "conduct." Id. at 908. The authors noted that
the Supreme Court has recognized activities such as entering onto a stranger's property
and ringing his doorbell, distributing leaflets, and even playing a portable phonograph for
potential contributors, as fully protected speech. Id. The article stressed that a holding
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may nevertheless be limited by reasonable time, manner, and
place restrictions.52 The constitutional standard for assessing
such restrictions focuses on whether the regulation serves a valid
and important government interest; is narrowly drawn to achieve
that interest; and is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion.53 Additionally, this standard, as applied to begging, means
that regulations restricting begging in a public forum must leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. 54
The homeless have a strong interest in communicating their
plight to the general public.5 5 Regulations that completely ban ex-
pressive conduct deprive a beggar of his or her ability to inform
the public that economic and social conditions render it impossible
for people to provide for themselves. 56 Aside from the societal
message that begging conveys, begging often amounts to a lifeline
which finds begging to be unprotected conduct cannot be reconciled in light of the Supreme
Court's rulings protecting such activities as those described above. Id.
52 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294-95 (1984) (rec-
ognizing demonstrators sleeping in capital's parks to protest homelessness was expressive
conduct subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions); see also Young, 903
F.2d at 160 (quoting New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d
718, 721 (2d Cir. 1984), recognizing blanket prohibition of particular type of speech in pub-
lic forum may be "reasonable time, place or manner restriction"). The court decided that a
regulation calling for an absolute ban on panhandling in the subways constituted a reason-
able time, place, and manner restriction. Id. But see Loper v. New York City Police Dep't,
802 F. Supp. 1029, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). The Loper
court, in invalidating a New York statute that amounted to a total ban on begging, by
prohibiting loitering for the purpose of begging, noted that no alternative means existed for
the needy to communicate their message of despair. Id.
53 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968). In O'Brien, the Supreme Court
set forth a test that is used to evaluate government regulations which affect conduct which
may have an expressive element. Id. The O'Brien court stated:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental in-
terest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id.; see also Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1039. In analyzing whether a government regulation is
sufficiently justified in regulating expressive conduct, the Loper court used this test as set
forth in O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 802 F. Supp. at 1037.
54 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 876
F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit noted that regulations must not completely
ban the speech at issue. Id.; see also Tier, supra note 51, at 324. (discussing constitutional
standard for weighing content-neutral restrictions of time, place, or manner of speech).
55 See Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1042. The beggar, in requesting money for his immediate
subsistence, often inadvertently communicates the valuable message that society has fun-
damentally failed in addressing the root causes of poverty. Id.
56 But see Chevigny, supra note 23, at 539. The author, in analyzing Young, noted that
the Second Circuit drew upon the discussion in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11
(1974), which concluded that conduct could be protected when "an intent to convey a partic-
ularized message was present, and... the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it." Id. The pivotal argument was that the beggar's
message, if one exists, will go unheard. Id.
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for many of society's poor.57 There are legitimate governmental in-
terests in regulating begging to provide for the public's general
health, safety, and welfare by preventing fraud,58 protecting citi-
zens from harassment, 59 and reducing vehicular and pedestrian
congestion.60 However, such regulations must be narrowly tai-
lored to achieve these governmental interests without unnecessa-
rily restricting a beggar's freedom to communicate.6 1 Further-
more, ample alternative channels must exist to enable one to
express whatever political, social, or economic message one
desires to convey.6 2 Regulations that restrict the time, manner,
and place in which beggars may solicit funds must meet these con-
stitutional standards. 3
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Advocates for the homeless have recently challenged the consti-
tutionality of antihomeless statutes under the Eighth Amend-
ment.6 4 This innovative approach maintains that ordinances
which prohibit sleeping in public areas constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment to the homeless based on their prohibition of the
involuntary status of homelessness. 5
57 See Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting
begging is frequently plea for such essentials as food, shelter, clothing, medical care, or
transportation).
58 See Riley v. National Fed'n for the Blind, 487 U.S. 789, 792 (1988) (finding protecting
public from fraud is sufficiently substantial interest); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't,
802 F. Supp. 1029, 1046-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (acknowledging government's interest in
preventing fraud).
59 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2708
(1992) (finding regulation of face-to-face solicitation may be appropriate because of risk of
duress present); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1453 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(upholding ordinance prohibiting begging which constitutes threats of bodily injury or
property damage as unprotected speech).
60 See ACORN v. St. Louis County, 930 F.2d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding significant
government interest in providing for traffic efficiency); Young v. New York City Transit
Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 158 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990) (recognizing begging in
subways impedes pedestrian traffic and creates potential dangers to public).
61 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional standard for as-
sessing regulation of expressive conduct).
62 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing necessity for regulations re-
stricting begging to provide alternative channels of communication).
63 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing how states may impose reason-
able time, manner, and place restrictions upon begging).
64 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides that: "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
fficted." Id.
65 See Johnson v. City of Dallas, No. CIV.A.3:94-CV-991-X, 1994 WL 447283, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 18, 1994) (holding ordinance prohibiting sleeping in public unconstitutional as
cruel and unusual punishment against homeless); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp.
QUALITY OF LIFE-AT WHAT PRICE?
The Supreme Court decision, Robinson v. California,6" is the
benchmark for assessing Eighth Amendment challenges. 67 In
Robinson, the Court held that punishing someone based on their
involuntary addiction to narcotics amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment .6  The Court based its decision on the fact that nar-
cotic addiction is a status, rather than a punishable act.69 Subse-
quently, however, in a plurality decision, the Supreme Court in
Texas v. Powell70 refused to extend the doctrine established in
Robinson, and upheld the conviction of a chronic alcoholic who
was arrested for public intoxication.71 Justice Thurgood Marshall,
writing for the plurality, stated that the defendant was punished
for his behavior, the act of being drunk, not the status of being a
chronic alcoholic.72
Justice Byron White's concurring opinion in Powell, however,
provides guidance for an expansion of the Eighth Amendment ar-
gument.71 Although Justice White acknowledged that the Robin-
son doctrine would not protect a person with a home from a con-
viction for public intoxication, he stated that the doctrine might
protect a homeless alcoholic, who had no choice but to drink in
public, from cruel and unusual punishment.7 4
At the heart of the Eighth Amendment argument is whether
acts performed by the homeless, such as sleeping or eating in pub-
lic areas, are merely manifestations of the status of being home-
1551, 1561 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (stating that conduct for which homeless are arrested is "insep-
arable from their involuntary condition of being homeless"); see also Tobe v. City of Santa
Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 393 (Ct. App. 1994) (upholding Eighth Amendment challenge to
ordinance). But see Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857-58 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (denying that homelessness is status to be afforded Eighth Amendment protection).
66 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
67 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660. The Robinson Doctrine was used to invalidate va-
grancy laws punishing status. Id.; see also Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58, 64
(W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
68 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 (holding criminalization of involuntary status of narcotic
addiction amounted to cruel and unusual punishment); see also Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at
1562 (recognizing that courts have overturned vagrancy ordinances based on Robinson be-
cause such ordinances punish status).
69 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 (equating drug addiction with illness).
70 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
71 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 532. The Court in Powell found that the offense of public intox-
ication punished the act of "being in public while drunk on a particular occasion," not the
mere status of being an alcoholic. Id.
72 Id. at 532.
73 Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring).
74 Id. (White, J., concurring).
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less or constitute conduct that may be punished.75 Advocates for
the homeless argue that the involuntary status of homelessness is
based on various economic, physical, and psychological factors
that may be beyond the control of homeless individuals. 76 Based
upon expert testimony, courts have recognized that social isola-
tion and the lack of access to shelter exacerbate the problems of
the homeless and may cause them to continue to perform harm-
less acts, such as eating or sleeping, in public places.77 Cities
throughout the nation continue to be unable to provide shelter to
those residing in public parks and spaces.78
Recently, in Johnson v. City of Dallas,79 the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Texas declared that though the
City had no obligation to provide shelter to the homeless, it would
amount to cruel and unusual punishment to allow the City of Dal-
las to penalize the homeless for sleeping in public.8 0 Lower courts
have permitted an expansion of the Robinson doctrine to protect
the homeless from being arrested for performing necessary life-
75 See Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 853-58 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (discuss-
ing the Eighth Amendment argument under the Robinson doctrine); Pottinger v. City of
Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561-65 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see also Donald E. Baker, "Anti-Home-
less"Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish the Homeless, 45 U. MIAI L. REv. 417,
441 (1991). Laws that punish the homeless for performing necessary life functions in public
spaces would be "disproportionately severe in relation to the . . . moral fault of the of-
fender," a rationale for the Eighth Amendment protection form cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Id. at 446.
76 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1563. Numerous experts testified to the base causes of
homelessness. Id. Expert testimony acknowledged that, except in rare cases, people rarely
choose to be homeless. Id. Sociology Professor James Wright testified that unemployment,
like physical and mental illness, becomes harder to overcome once a person becomes home-
less. Id. at 1564.
77 See Johnson v. City of Dallas, No. CIV.A.3:94-CV-991-X, 1994 WL 447283, at *6 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 18, 1994) (stating that if there were beds for each of Dallas's homeless then
homelessness would be choice and not status). Id.; Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564 (discuss-
ing experts' testimony explaining effects of being homeless).
78 See Johnson, 1994 WL 447283, at * 5. The court noted that there are people in Dallas
with no place to go, and no alternative but to reside in public spaces. Id. There are not
enough shelters to meet the demand of the homeless. Id. See also Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at
1564. See generally Everybody's Problem, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that there were ap-
proximately 700 beds in Miami's shelters for estimated 6,000 individuals). The homeless
have extended out from the traditional urban skid rows into middle-American suburbs and
small cities, which are frequently less capable of or less willing than big cities to address
the problem. Id. New York is the nation's leader in terms of homelessness, with an esti-
mated 10% of the total U.S. population of homeless people. Id. Estimates of the size of New
York City's homeless population range from 34,000 to more than 100,000 individuals. Id.
79 No. CIV.A.3:9-CV-991-X, 1994 WL 447283 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 1994).
80 See id. at *6. In discussing whether the City of Dallas was obligated to provide hous-
ing to the homeless, the court explicitly stated that the City was not obligated to provide
the homeless with "anything." Id.
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sustaining activities such as sleeping and eating in public.8 ' More-
over, courts have found that harmless conduct, which the home-
less must perform in public in order to survive, is merely a mani-
festation of their homeless status and therefore not punishable.8 2
In Pottinger v. City of Miami, 3 the plaintiffs claimed municipal
liability 4 based on the City of Miami's custom, policy, and prac-
tice of arresting, harassing, and interfering with homeless people
and their property for performing life's daily basic functions in
public spaces.8 5 The plaintiffs did not challenge the validity of the
statutes, 6 but they asserted that the City applied these laws in a
discriminatory fashion, with the explicit intent to drive the home-
less from public areas.8 7
81 See Johnson, 1994 WL 447283, at *5 (applying Robinson doctrine in invalidating anti-
sleeping ordinance); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
The Pottinger court recognized that due to the "unavailability of low-income housing or
alternative shelter, plaintiffs have no choice but to conduct life-sustaining activities in pub-
lic spaces." Id. Experts on homelessness and sociology testified that homelessness results
for the most part from factors including economic crises and physical and psychological
impairments that are outside the control of those afflicted. Id. at 1563. Impediments to
securing adequate shelter by the homeless include: social isolation, lack of low-income
housing and government benefits, illness, and unemployment. Id. at 1564; see also Tobe v.
City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 393 (Ct. App. 1994) (extending Robinson doctrine
to protect homeless living in public areas by invalidating anticamping ordinance).
82 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in
Robinson); see also Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564 (recognizing that harmless conduct for
which homeless are arrested is inseparable from their involuntary status of being home-
less); Tobe, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393-94 (invalidating anticamping ordinance as punishment
for poverty). But see Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(denying homeless protection under Eighth Amendment because homelessness is not read-
ily classified as status); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1048
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (casting doubt on viability of Eighth Amendment claim brought on behalf
of the homeless in response to New York's blanket ban on begging), aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d
Cir. 1993).
83 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
84 Id. at 1561 (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (authorizing municipal liability where a persistent
or widespread policy of local government inflicts injury). See generally 1 CviM RIGHTS LI-
BRIARY SECTION 1983 LITIGATION Ch. 7 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing municipal liability).
85 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1554. These activities include sleeping and eating in public
by the homeless because they have no other alternative. Id.; see Baker, supra note 75, at
457-63 (commenting on decision in Pottinger).
86 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1559. The City of Miami arrested thousands of homeless
over a period of three years for violating various ordinances and statutes. Id.; see MIAM,
FLA., CODE § 37-53.1 (1990) (prohibiting obstructing sidewalks); MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-63
(1990) (prohibiting sleeping in public); MIAMI, FLA.., CODE § 38-3 (1990) (prohibiting pres-
ence in parks between hours of 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.). A majority of the arrest reports
indicated that the arrests were not for disorderly behavior, and many were merely for the
act of sleeping. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1559-60.
87 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1554, 1566. The plaintiff's malicious abuse of process
claim failed, but the court did find that the city used its arrest process for the ulterior
purpose of "purging" the homeless from public spaces. Id. at 1566. Police Department mem-
oranda illustrated the detailed strategy devised to remove "undesirables" from parks and
'sanitize" the areas. Id. at 1567.
104 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:89
Plaintiffs asserted an Eighth Amendment challenge, claiming
that they were victims of discrimination due to their involuntary
status of being homeless.88 The court stated that although the
government's interest in maintaining orderly, aesthetically pleas-
ing streets and parks, and promoting tourism and development
was important, it could not justify arresting the homeless for inno-
cent acts. 9 Ultimately, the court held that the City of Miami was
liable to the homeless because policymakers within the city had
constructive knowledge of the targeted arrests.9 0 The court or-
dered that counsel for both parties create "safe zones" where the
homeless could reside without fear of arrest. 91
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia refused to recognize homelessness as a status in Joyce v. City
of San Francisco.92 In Joyce, a group of homeless persons sought
preliminary injunctive relief enjoining the City from enforcing
part of a comprehensive social service and law enforcement pro-
gram called the "Matrix Quality of Life Program."93 The plaintiffs
challenged the portion of the program that penalized homeless in-
dividuals for performing life-sustaining activities in public
88 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1578. The plaintiffs argued that because the homeless do
not have access to private property, they must perform their daily activities in public. Id.
The court recognized that the homeless may exhibit the "traditional indicia of suspectness"
as a class. Id. (citing the test set forth in San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973)). The court was hesitant to rule on the issue of suspectness, but indicated that the
homeless evidenced the traditional indicia. Id.
89 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1583. The policy of arresting homeless persons for harmless
acts was deemed unconstitutional because the arrests were cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment, burdened the fundamental right to travel, and violated the
Due Process Clause. Id. at 1584. The court also held that the city's practice of seizing and
destroying the personal belongings of the homeless violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
1573.
90 Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The City consist-
ently failed to prevent "improper police conduct." Id.
91 Id. at 1584-85 (enjoining police from arresting homeless for harmless, innocent
conduct).
92 846 F. Supp. 843, 857-58 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
93 Id. at 845-46. The Matrix Quality of Life Program is aimed at providing social services
to homeless people and eradicating street crime. Id. at 845-46. The program specifically
targets "public drinking and inebriation, obstruction of sidewalks, lodging, camping or
sleeping in public parks, littering, public urination and defecation, aggressive panhandling,
dumping of refuse, graffiti, vandalism, street prostitution and street sales of narcotics
among others." Id. at 846. The court emphasized the nonpunitive aspects of the program
which provide for "shelter, medical care, information about services and general assist-
ance" to the homeless and needy. Id. at 847. The program was structured around a coopera-
tive effort involving the Department of Social Services, the Department of Public Health,
the Police Department, and the Department of Public Works. Id.; see also Tyson supra note
8 (reporting on the Matrix Program).
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places.94 The district court denied the plaintiffs' claim for injunc-
tive relief because the proposed injunction lacked the specificity
necessary to be enforceable and the plaintiffs failed to show suc-
cess on the merits of their constitutional claims.9 5
In assessing the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim, the court
distinguished decisions of other jurisdictions which recognized
that the status of homelessness can be protected from penal sanc-
tions.96 Moreover, the court concluded that homelessness is a con-
dition, not a status to be afforded constitutional protection. 97 The
court noted that finding otherwise would potentially extend con-
stitutional protection to any condition over which defendants
could show that they had no control.98 In determining whether
homelessness is a status, like drug addiction, the court addressed
two factors: whether the characteristic at issue was present at
birth, and the degree to which an individual had control over the
characteristic. 99
C. Anti-Sleeping Ordinances as a Violation of the Fundamental
Right to Travel
Courts have considered whether anti-sleeping ordinances' 0 0
burden the fundamental right to travel because such laws may
94 Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 846 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Life-sustaining
activities consist of basic routines of daily life that include sleeping and eating. Id.; Pottin-
ger, 810 F. Supp. at 1554.
95 Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 851. The court noted two reasons for denying preliminary in-
junctive relief: (1) the plaintiff's request lacked the "necessary specificity to be enforceable,"
and (2) the plaintiffs failed to establish a "sufficient probability of success on the merits to
warrant injunctive relief." Id.
96 See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1562-65 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (in-
validating ordinances, pursuant to Eighth Amendment, which prohibited homeless from
lying down, sleeping, standing, sitting, or performing other essential life-sustaining activi-
ties in public places); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 393 (Ct. App. 1994)
(equating homelessness with illness and addiction as involuntary status not subject to
criminal prosecution); see also Johnson v. City of Dallas, No. CIV.A.3:94-CV-991-X, 1994
WL 447283, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 1994) (holding that ordinance prohibiting sleeping in
public as applied against homeless is unconstitutional).
97 Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857. The Joyce court stated that they were "unable to conclude
at this time that the extension of the Eighth Amendment to the acts at issue here is war-
ranted by governing authorities." Id.
98 Id. at 858. The court concluded that without precedent from the Supreme Court, con-
stitutional protection cannot be extended to any condition for which "a showing could be
made that the defendants had no control." Id. But see Johnson, 1994 WL 447283, at *5
(pertaining to sleeping ordinance). "The evidence demonstrates that for a number of Dallas
homeless at this time homelessness is involuntary and irremediable. They have no place to
go other than the public lands they live on." Id.
99 See Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
100 See, e.g., Seeley v. State, 655 P.2d 803, 807-08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that City
Code provision making it unlawful to sleep, lie, or remain in public right-of-way was not
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make it impossible for the homeless to enter or remain in a com-
munity. 1° 1 Although the Supreme Court has unequivocally recog-
nized a fundamental right to interstate travel, 10 2 the Court has
expressly refrained from extending such a right to intrastate
travel. 10 3 Lower courts, however, have determined that a funda-
mental right to intrastate travel exists.10 4
Anti-sleeping ordinances burden the right to travel primarily
when no shelter exists. 0 5 Consequently, a homeless person must
decide to either break the law or leave the community. 0 6 Addi-
tionally, law enforcement officers rely on anti-sleeping ordinances
for authority to conduct arrest sweeps directed against the home-
less.10 7 It can be argued that courts should render such ordinances
invalid as a violation of the freedom of movement when they ulti-
unconstitutional); People v. Davenport, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736, 738 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985)
(holding that ordinance prohibiting sleeping in any public spaces between hours of 10:00
a.m. and 6:00 a.m. was not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986); cf City of
Pompano Beach v. Capalbo, 455 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding city
ordinance prohibiting lodging or sleeping in motor vehicle on any public property within
city limits unconstitutional), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985); State v. Penley, 276 So. 2d
180, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (invalidating City of St. Petersburg ordinance prohibit-
ing sleeping in public spaces), cert. denied, 281 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1973); City of Portland v.
Johnson, 651 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding regulations prohibiting sleep-
ing in public).
101 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1579; Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392 (holding custom,
policy, and practice targeting evicting homeless from public spaces within city limits as
violation of right to travel). But see Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 860 (denying right to travel
claim). Cf Seeley, 655 P.2d at 808 (stating that anti-sleeping ordinance did not prohibit
movement, but actually encouraged it).
102 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966). The Court stated that: "The
constitutional right to travel from one state to another.., occupies a position fundamental
to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and
repeatedly recognized." Id.; see also Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 n.2
(1986) (finding that right to migrate is firmly established).
103 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1579 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (stating that
Supreme Court has not directly expressed whether right to travel includes intrastate
travel); see also Ades, supra note 14, at 609-13 (arguing that right to travel encompasses
intrastate travel).
104 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1579 (citing King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442
F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971)). The King holding pointed out
that it would be illogical to protect the rights of one migrating from outside the state, and
not afford the same protection to one within the state. King, 442 F.2d at 648-49.
105 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1580. See generally Ades, supra note 14, at 616-23
(stating that these ordinances discourage homeless persons from entering or remaining in
area governed by such legislation).
106 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (examining local efforts burdening right to
travel).
107 Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 392. The court found that the city enacted the anticamping
ordinance because previous efforts to rid the area of the homeless failed when challenged
through litigation. Id. Arrest sweeps were a component of a larger plan to rid the City of
Santa Ana of vagrants quickly and efficiently. Id.
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mately deprive the homeless of the ability to perform one of life's
basic functions-sleeping-within a community.'0 8
In order to survive constitutional scrutiny, a regulation which
implicates the fundamental right to travel, such as an anti-sleep-
ing ordinance, must be a necessary means to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. 10 9 Government objectives commonly asso-
ciated with the homeless, such as health and safety concerns, are
better served by providing shelter, medical services, and protec-
tion to the needy, rather than subjecting them to arrest. 110
D. Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges
1. Due Process
Quality-of-life laws which adversely affect the homeless often
raise the specter of Due Process"' and Equal Protection 1 2 chal-
lenges." L  Such challenges are grounded in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments of the Constitution." 4 Advocates of the
homeless turn to the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to
ensure governmental fairness with regard to antibegging and
108 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1580 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (stating
ordinances preventing homeless from performing necessary life functions in public areas
violate right to travel). Id.
109 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634 (1969) (holding freedom of movement as
fundamental right); see also Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1581 (finding that City of Miami's
interest in promoting tourism and business and maintaining parks was not compelling gov-
ernmental interest).
110 See McCain v. Dinkins, 84 N.Y.2d 216, 229, 639 N.E.2d 1132, 1140, 616 N.Y.S.2d
335, 343 (1994) (holding New York City and City officials in contempt and describing prob-
lem of housing homeless families in New York City as "municipal government problem of
mammoth proportions and complexity"); Callahan v. Carey, 118 A.D.2d 1054, 1054, 499
N.Y.S.2d 567, 567 (1st Dep't 1986) (recognizing right to shelter through consent decree).
See generally JOEL BLAu, TIM VISIBLE POOR, HomELEss IN TmE UNITED STATES, 98-108
(1992) (discussing history of legal advocacy for homeless and establishment of right to shel-
ter in New York City); Maria L. Ciampi, Note, Building a House of Legal Rights:A Plea for
the Homeless, 59 ST. Jom'es L. REv. 530, 530 (1985) (stating that homeless should be recog-
nized to ensure their political influence); Christine Robitscher Ladd, Note, A Right to Shel-
ter for the Homeless in New York State, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 272, 285-89 (1986) (discussing
right to shelter emanating from New York State Constitution).
111 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall... be
deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law." Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Id.
112 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
113 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1575-78 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Tobe, 27
Cal. Rptr. at 394. (discussing due process and equal protection challenges to antihomeless
legislation).
114 See supra notes 111-12 (listing Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
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anti-sleeping ordinances. 115 Increasingly, such ordinances are en-
acted by legislators in response to demands by "compassion-fa-
tigued" constituents-citizens whose former empathy toward the
plight of the homeless has changed into intolerance. 116 Compas-
sion-fatigue reflects the growing consensus among homeless advo-
cates, social workers, government officials, and taxpayers that the
increased efforts of the 1980's, designed to eradicate homeless-
ness, have failed. 1 17
The guarantees of procedural due process require that an ordi-
nance delineate clear legal standards so the public is on notice
that certain behavior is unlawful."" Such standards provide a
safeguard against the arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
of laws by the police. 1 9 Historically, vagrancy laws120 permitted
the police to apply largely unbridled discretion in enforcing
prohibitions against sleeping in public, obstructing public path-
ways, and loitering or trespassing on public property.' 2 1
115 See infra notes 118-19 (discussing challenges to antibegging and anti-sleeping
ordinances).
116 See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (discussing stated mission of commu-
nity to remove all indigents); see also Millich, supra note 49, at 259 (discussing compassion-
fatigue in context of antibegging legislation and First Amendment protection). The author
stated that empathy has turned to intolerance as Americans seek to remove the homeless
from public view. Id. Economic recession, unemployment, and increased homelessness have
sparked public hostility towards the homeless. Id. at 261. According to the Assistant Direc-
tor of the National Coalition for the Homeless, Michael Stoops, compassion-fatigue has
prompted legislatures in at least twelve major cities in the late 1980's to early 1990's to
enact antibegging ordinances. Id. at 265.
117 See Everybody's Problem, supra note 7, at 10. The author claimed that the country is
now afflicted with "compassion-fatigue." Id. Mainstream America collectively addressed the
problem of the homeless through fundraising, shelter construction, and legislation which
provided funding for the eradication of homelessness, such as the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11472 (1988). Id. Increased numbers of home-
less persons indicate that these efforts have failed. Everybody's Problem, supra, at 10.
11s See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding ordinance
void for vagueness because it failed to give fair notice of forbidden conduct and encouraged
arbitrary arrests and convictions); see also Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1575. The court dis-
cussed vagrancy statutes that have been declared unconstitutional on due process grounds.
Id.
119 See Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983). The Court addressed the two
elements that the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine focuses on: (1) that an ordinance must pro-
vide notice and (2) that it avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. The Court
stressed the second element-"the requirement that a legislature establish minimum
guidelines to govern law enforcement." Id.
120 See 77 AM. JuR. 2D Vagrancy § 1 (1975). The common law defined vagrancy as: "wan-
dering or going about from place to place by an idle person who has no visible means of
support, and who subsists on charity and does not work for a living although he is able to
do so." Id.
121 See Papachristou, 404 U.S. at 159-61 (examining arrests for loitering resulting from
"arbitrary and discriminatory" enforcement of vagrancy laws); see also Simon, supra note
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In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville,'122 held vagrancy laws to be unconstitutionally vague.123 Jus-
tice William 0. Douglas noted that the City of Jacksonville's va-
grancy statute allowed for the arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement of the law and that it failed to provide sufficient no-
tice of the prohibited conduct. 124 The Court in Papachristou de-
clared that vagrancy ordinances criminalized activity that would
normally be deemed lawful. 125 Papachristou established that in
order to be valid, an ordinance must provide standards governing
the exercise of discretion by police. 126 In the absence of such stan-
dards, a literal application of many anti-sleeping ordinances could
lead to the result that a person who has fallen asleep in a park
while picnicking is in violation of a prohibition against sleeping in
public spaces. 127 Extending Papachristou and its progeny to an-
tihomeless legislation may lead to the conclusion that lawmakers
must carefully draft laws to discourage arbitrary and discrimina-
tory enforcement of laws which tend to target the homeless. 12
Vagrancy and loitering statutes have also been invalidated by
due process challenges based on overbreadth.129 A regulation is
20, at 638-40. The Simon article traced vagrancy legislation in America from its roots in
English law to the present day implications for the homeless. Id.
122 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
123 Id. at 162.
12A Id.; see Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1575 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
125 See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 163.
126 See id. at 170. The Court noted that it is imperative to our system of justice that the
laws be equally applied to both rich and poor, minority and majority. Id. at 171.
127 See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 163-64. The Court listed examples of conduct pro-
scribed by the vagrancy ordinance, which inadvertently included lawful activity. Id. For
example, a statute that makes it a crime to be "habitually living upon the earnings" of one's
spouse while capable of working, results in criminalizing the act of being unemployed due
to recession or increased technology in the work place. Id.
128 See City of Pompano Beach v. Capalbo, 455 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985) (voiding statute prohibiting sleeping in vehicles for vague-
ness); State v. Penley, 276 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 281 So. 2d 504
(Fla. 1973) (holding ordinance prohibiting sleeping in public void). The court found that the
ordinance did not distinguish between conduct intended to do harm and that which is basi-
cally innocent. Id. But see People v. Davenport, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736, 738-39 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986) (holding ordinance prohibiting sleeping
in certain public areas not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad).
129 See Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309,312, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742, 229 N.E.2d 426, 428
(1967) (invalidating statute allowing for overbroad police discretion). The court found that
the statute provided for punishment of an activity which did not impinge upon the rights of
others or disrupt public order. Id. Compare Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386,
394 n.11 (Ct. App. 1994) (claiming that overbreadth challenges are not limited to First
Amendment challenges) with Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 862 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984). The Joyce court stated
that overbreadth is a challenge brought only where First Amendment issues are a concern.
846 F. Supp. at 862.
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overbroad when it proscribes more conduct than is necessary to
realize stated government objectives. 13 0 When less restrictive al-
ternatives exist to achieve the governmental interests of main-
taining order and preserving the aesthetic qualities of outdoor
spaces, it may be unreasonable for courts to uphold laws that
sanction innocent activities such as sleeping outdoors in order to
realize those objectives.131
2. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause ensures the neutrality of laws
passed by the legislature. 132 Quality-of-life laws that result in ar-
rests of the homeless may implicate equal protection guarantees
by being discriminatory.13 3 Courts have recognized that the home-
less are an increasingly unpopular, politically powerless group
often subjected to organized efforts to drive them from the public's
view. 134
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protection by
treating all similarly situated persons alike.' 3 5 In recent cases
where regulations aimed at restoring public order have adversely
affected the homeless, courts have tried to ascertain whether the
regulations reflect official animus against the homeless. 136 In Rou-
130 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1576 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (emphasizing
ordinances resulting in arrests based on harmless conduct).
131 See Ades, supra note 14, at 625-27 (listing governmental interests advanced by local
governments in response to constitutional challenges).
132 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
'33 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1583 (holding laws that are aimed at improving
Miami's quality of life adversely impact homeless and infringe upon their right to travel in
violation of Equal Protection Clause).
134 See Johnson v. City of Dallas, No. CIV.A.3:94-CV-991-X, 1994 WL 447283, at *12
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 1994). The district court discussed how vagrancy laws may indicate a
systematic prejudice against the poor and the homeless. Id. However, the court asserted
that the homeless have political support by virtue of their representation in litigation, and
the numerous advocacy organizations that exist for their benefit. Id.
135 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Equal
protection has been described by the Supreme Court as "essentially a direction that all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike." Id. A group home for the mentally-
challenged successfully sought review of a city's zoning decision that denied them a special
use permit. Id. at 435. The Court stated that under the Equal Protection Clause, state laws
are subject to strict scrutiny when they impinge on personal rights protected by the Consti-
tution. Id. at 440. Such laws will only be upheld if they are tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. Id.
136 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1561 (holding city's custom, policy, and practice of
arresting, harassing, and interfering with homeless unconstitutional); Tobe v. City of
Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 387-88 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding municipal anticamping
ordinance prohibiting storage of personal property constitutionally repugnant). The ordi-
nance, while having a laudable public purpose, entirely suppressed the homeless and left
them with no place to go. Id. at 395; cf Church v. City of Hunstville, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th
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lette v. City of Seattle,137 in addition to the action challenging the
City's "aggressive begging" ordinance, 138 the plaintiffs also ques-
tioned the constitutionality of an ordinance that prohibited sitting
or lying down on public sidewalks located in commercial areas of
the city during certain hours. 13 9 The plaintiffs made numerous
claims with respect to the anti-sleeping ordinance. These claims
alleged that the ordinance was: (1) invalid because it was
vague;' 40 (2) violative of the fundamental right to travel;' 4' (3) a
denial of equal protection; 42 and (4) violative of the right of free
expression.143 The City contended that the purpose of the ordi-
Cir. 1994) (denying preliminary injunctive relief to homeless claiming custom, policy, and
practice of harassment by police); Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 845, 859
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding comprehensive law enforcement program which encompasses so-
cial services element not hostile to homeless population).
137 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
138 See SEATrLE, WASH. MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015(AX1) (1987). This section prohibits beg-
ging with the "intent to intimidate." Id.; see also SEArrLE, WASH. MUN. CODE
§ 12A.12.015(A)(2) (1987). The regulation defines "intimidate" as conduct which "would
make a reasonable person fearful or feel compelled." Id.
139 SEATTL, WASH. MUN. CODE § 15.48.040 (1993). The statute provides: "No person,
after having been notified by a law enforcement officer that he or she is in violation of the
prohibition in this section, shall sit or lie down upon a public sidewalk, or upon a blanket,
chair, stool, or any other object placed upon a public sidewalk, during the hours between
7:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m." in commercial areas. Id.
140 See Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1445. In asserting their procedural due process claim
plaintiff's relied on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 (1972) and Shut-
tlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87,87 (1965), comparing Seattle's sidewalk ordi-
nance to the vagrancy statutes that were struck down for allowing arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement of the law. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1445-46. The court rejected the
plaintiff's vagueness claim and found that the sidewalk ordinance clearly defined the pro-
scribed behavior and did not grant police officers the discretion to define the prohibited
conduct in an arbitrary manner. Id. at 1446.
141 Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1447 (citing Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez,
476 U.S. 898 (1986) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), recognizing right to
travel as fundamental constitutional right). The court, however, held that the sidewalk
ordinance did not impermissibly impinge upon the plaintiff's right to travel because it did
not represent a total restriction of movement. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1448. Under the
ordinance, individuals are free to travel into commercial areas and are free to sit or lie
down elsewhere. Id. The district court found that the ordinance was justified by Seattle's
substantial interest in preserving aesthetically pleasing public facilities. Id. The court dis-
tinguished the Seattle ordinance from the ordinances at issue in Pottinger and Tobe where
they were the result of a coordinated effort to drive the homeless from public spaces by
attempting to ban access to all public areas. Id.
142 Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1449-50 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (denying
plaintiff's request to treat homelessness as suspect class and applying minimal scrutiny
test in finding ordinance constitutional).
143 Id. at 1448-49. The court refused to recognize the act of sitting or lying down as
protected expressive conduct. Id. They further noted that to do so would virtually require
that every act by homeless people in public be acknowledged as a social statement pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Id.
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nance was to provide safe and efficient movement of pedestrians
and goods on public sidewalks."'
In addressing the viability of the constitutional claims, the court
distinguished the plaintiffs' arguments relying on prior decisions
that were favorable to the homeless, Pottinger v. City of Miami145
and Tobe v. City of Santa Ana," 6 by explaining that the ordi-
nances involved in Roulette were not the result of a concerted ef-
fort by municipal leaders to target the homeless. 147 Consequently,
the court held that under the rational basis test 148 the City's legit-
imate interests in public safety were rationally related to and ad-
vanced by the prohibition on sitting or lying down on public
streets. 149
In Tobe, upon invalidating an anticamping ordinance,15 0 the
California Court of Appeals discussed at length the City of Santa
Ana's systematic "crusade against the homeless."15 ' The stated
goal of this program was to remove all indigents and their belong-
ings from the community.' 52 To accomplish this goal, the City
144 Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1445. The legislative intent listed specific purposes such as
enhancing public safety and promoting the "economic health and productivity of commer-
cial areas." Id.
145 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text
(discussing challenges brought in Pottinger).
146 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Ct. App. 1994); see infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text
(discussing challenges brought in Tobe).
147 Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1448 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
148 See infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing rational relation test).
149 Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1447. The legitimate government interests that the ordi-
nance sought to protect are ensuring pedestrian safety and protecting the economic vitality
of the commercial areas. Id.
150 See Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392. In invalidating the ordinance, the court noted that
government interests affecting the homeless include a significant interest in providing for
the efficient use of, and preserving the aesthetic qualities of, public facilities. Id. at 394.
However, though substantial, the government's interests may not entirely suppress the
fundamental rights and interests of a minority group. Id.
151 See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1994). In 1990, the
City of Santa Ana agreed to cease policies which discriminated against the homeless, in-
cluding police "sweeps" of public spaces and arrests of the homeless for trivial offenses. Id.
Some acts that were considered criminal prior to the stipulation were dropping a match, a
leaf, or a piece of paper. Id. The court chronicled detailed evidence that was presented to
the trial court which illustrated a virtual "crusade against the homeless." Id. at 387.
152 Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387. As early as 1988, a task force was formed with the
purpose of fulfilling Santa Ana City Council's policy that 'vagrants are no longer welcome
in the City." Id. The court recited repeated actions taken by the City to dispel homeless,
including the confiscation of abandoned shopping carts and sleeping bags used by the
homeless and stored on public property. Id. at 388. Other actions included strictly enforcing
park closing hours, harassment sweeps conducted by the police, and the regular use of
water sprinklers to render public areas unfit for sleeping or lying. Id. The court stated that
the facts in Tobe were similar to and could not be distinguished from similar attempts to
target the homeless that were declared unconstitutional in Pottinger. Id. at 393 n.8. The
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Council not only enacted an anticamping ordinance, 5 but also
employed a sweeping policy which specifically targeted the home-
less.15 4 Though the California Court of Appeals did not weigh the
constitutionality of these acts within an equal protection frame-
work, it appears that such manifestations of government hostility
are within the scope of what the Equal Protection Clause was en-
acted to prevent. 15
5
II. LAWS IMPACTING THE HOMELESS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO
HEIGHTENED LEVELS OF SCRUTINY
Laws that discriminate on the basis of suspect classification, 156
or which impinge upon fundamental rights, 1 7 are subject to strict
scrutiny, and will be upheld only if they are narrowly tailored to
meet a compelling governmental interest.15 8 The Supreme Court
has also developed an intermediate level of scrutiny which re-
Tobe court stated that the ordinance enacted was a covert attempt to sidestep the 1990
stipulation. Id. at 392.
153 See Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388. The court referred to Santa Ana's passage of the
anticamping ordinance as another "offensive" in the "war on the homeless." Id. The ordi-
nance provides that:
[Tihe public streets and areas within the City of Santa Ana should be readily accessi-
ble and available to residents and the public at large. The use of these areas for camp-
ing purposes or storage of personal property interferes with the rights of others to use
the areas for which they were intended. The purpose of this Article is to maintain
public streets and areas within the City of Santa Ana in a clean and accessible
condition.
SANTA ANA, CAL. MUN. CODE, ch. 10, art. VIII, § 10-400 (1992).
154 Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387-89 (discussing task force objectives designed to remove
vagrants from city limits).
155 See Simon, supra note 20, at 664-670 (discussing equal protection analysis of dis-
criminatory actions against vagrants).
156 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Justice Harlan
Fisk Stone's famous dictum recognized that a classification is suspect if it is directed to a
"discrete and insular minority." Id. But see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
290 n.28 (1978) (weakening Justice Stone's Carolene criteria by noting that discreetness
and insularity are not necessary to holding particular classification invidious).
157 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding
Miami's practice of arresting indigents infringes on their fundamental right to travel).
158 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Govern-
ment actions which discriminate on the basis of suspect classifications (race, alienage, and
national origin), or which impinge on constitutionally protected rights, will be valid only if
they are narrowly tailored to meet compelling governmental interests. Id. This need for a
strong nexus between the ends and means of a classification is because suspect classifica-
tions "are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy." Id. Under
heightened scrutiny the law must be substantially related to an important governmental
purpose. Id. at 441; see also Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904
(1986) (noting that state law classifications infringing upon constitutionally protected
rights require heightened justification); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1581 (finding that ar-
resting indigents for sleeping, lying down, or eating in public serves no compelling state
interests).
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quires that a classification must be substantially related to an im-
portant governmental interest.5 9 Intermediate scrutiny is not as
stringent as strict scrutiny and, therefore, does not require as
great a nexus between the government's objectives to be achieved
and the means employed to obtain those objectives.' To date,
only legislative classifications based on gender 16 1 or illegiti-
macy 16 2 have been afforded the intermediate level of scrutiny by
the Supreme Court. 163 Lacking a finding of strict or heightened
scrutiny, a legislative classification need only bear a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate government interest. 16 4
The Supreme Court has not delineated a precise test for deter-
mining which groups qualify for suspect or quasi-suspect sta-
tus. 16 5 Several factors have been considered by the Court in deter-
mining whether a law should be subjected to heightened
scrutiny.166  One factor the Supreme Court has addressed is
whether the affected group's defining characteristic is immuta-
ble.16 7 Race, alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin have been
159 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). The Court rea-
soned that legislation must have an "exceedingly persuasive justification" when such legis-
lation classifies individuals based on gender (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455,
461 (1981) and Personnel Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). Id. The
Court in Hogan stated that laws meet the burden of "exceedingly persuasive justification"
by showing at the minimum, that the classification "serves 'important government objec-
tives ... and that the means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.'" 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142, 150 (1980)).
160 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
161 E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (holding gender irrelevant classifica-
tion for purpose of establishing drinking age).
162 E.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 762 (1977) (viewing illegitimacy as classifica-
tion subject to intermediate scrutiny).
163 See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text (discussing intermediate scrutiny).
164 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (noting tradi-
tional standard of review "requires only that State's system be shown to bear some rational
relationship to legitimate state purpose"); see also GERALD GuNTHER, CONSTrruONAL LAW
608-09 (12th ed. 1991). The author notes that under the basic standard of the Court's equal
protection analysis only a "minimal" fit must exist between legislative means and objec-
tives. Id.
165 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (stating that "[sleveral formulations
might explain our treatment of certain classifications as 'suspect' "); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that Supreme Court has "applied a spectrum of
standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause").
166 See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text (listing factors used to determine
whether group may be protected under heightened scrutiny); see also TamE, supra note 36,
§ 16-23, at 1545 (discussing criteria used in determining suspectness).
167 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting immu-
table characteristics are "seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state inter-
est"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (noting immutable characteristics
such as sex, race, and national origin are "determined solely by the accident of birth").
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established as immutable characteristics, that are unalterable or
beyond an individual's control. 168 The Court has also considered
whether a group has historically suffered from discrimination 169
or has a history of political powerlessness. 1 70 Furthermore, the
Court has considered whether the defining characteristic of a
group is at all related to its members' ability to perform in or con-
tribute to society. 1
7
'
The protection of heightened scrutiny was recently expanded by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
which held that laws adversely affecting individuals based on
their sexual orientation would be subjected to strict or heightened
scrutiny. 172 In rendering its decision, the court weighed such fac-
168 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. Laws that classify based upon race, alienage, or na-
tional origin are "subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id. Courts also recognize gender and megiti-
macy as quasi-suspect classes. Id. at 440-41; see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
377 (1971) (recognizing alienage as suspect class); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 218 (1944) (recognizing national origin as suspect class).
169 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-42 (noting discrimination may be longstanding and "is
unlikely to be rectified soon by legislative means"); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (weighing whether aged have been subjected to long-
standing discriminatory treatment); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85 (noting sex discrimina-
tion has "long and unfortunate history" in United States).
170 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (recognizing
political powerlessness as traditional indicia of suspectness); see also Pottinger v. City of
Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (noting that homeless may be afforded
extraordinary protection due in part to political powerlessness).
171 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-44 (finding mentally-challenged people have reduced
ability to cope and function with everyday challenges, and legislative distinctions based
upon their reduced abilities are constitutionally permissible). The Court noted that certain
characteristics like illegitimacy are beyond an individual's control and bear no relation to
an individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society. Id. at 441; Matthews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (finding individual's ability to participate in and contribute
to society is not dependent upon illegitimacy status); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 310-11, 315 (hold-
ing individual's age bears relationship to ability to perform as police officer); Frontiero, 411
U.S. at 686 (deciding gender "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contrib-
ute to society"); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) (stating legislation
adversely affecting groups "by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggest the
kind of 'class or caste' treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
abolish").
172 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-93-773,
1994 WL 442746, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 1994). Plaintiffs challenged a referendum which
repealed ordinances enacted to prohibit discrimination based upon sexual orientation in
city employment and appointments. Id. In weighing whether legislation adversely im-
pacting individuals based on their sexual orientation should be subjected to heightened or
strict scrutiny, the court outlined the most decisive factors put forth by the Supreme Court
in determining suspect classification. Id. at *16. The court concluded that "sexual orienta-
tion is a quasi-suspect classification." Id. at *18. The court based its decision on five factors:
(1) whether an individual's sexual orientation bears any relationship to his or her abil-
ity to perform, or to participate in, or contribute to, society; (2) whether the members of
the group have any control over their sexual orientation; (3) whether sexual orienta-
tion is an immutable characteristic; (4) whether that group has suffered a history of
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tors as whether gays, lesbians, and bisexuals have been subjected
to a history of discriminatory treatment, suffer from political
powerlessness, or have been handicapped by such disabilities that
extraordinary protection as a group is warranted. 173
The Supreme Court has refused to recognize classifications
based on wealth or poverty as suspect. 174 However, the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in Pottinger v.
City of Miami,17 1 opened the door for an inquiry into whether the
laws affecting the homeless should be subjected to heightened
levels of scrutiny by recognizing that the homeless may commonly
possess the traditional indicia of suspectness. 76 Although courts
have been reluctant to extend suspect classification to the home-
less,17 7 the Supreme Court has evidenced a tendency to disfavor
legislative distinctions based upon wealth.17  In San Antonio In-
discrimination based on their sexual orientation; and (5) whether the class is politi-
cally powerless.
Id.
173 See Equality Foundation, 1994 WL 442746, at *18-20 (weighing factors of suspect-
ness applying to sexual orientation).
174 See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (finding that statutes
affecting wealthy and poor unequally are not afforded strict scrutiny analysis solely on that
basis); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (explaining poverty alone is not basis for
suspect classification); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 , 470-71 (1977) (stating that financial
need alone does not identify suspect class in denying poor women suspect classification).
175 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
176 Id. at 1578. Though the court recognized that the homeless evidence "traditional indi-
cia of suspectness," the court declined to rule on whether the homeless should be afforded
the protection of a suspect class. Id. But see infra note 177 (discussing courts denying sus-
pect classification to homeless).
177 See, e.g., Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 n.36 (3d Cir. 1992) (con-
cluding that homelessness does not warrant suspect classification); Johnson v. City of Dal-
las, No. CIV.A.3:94-CV-991X, 1994 WL 447283, at *11-13 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 1994) (deny-
ing suspect classification to homeless because this classification lacks some fair
relationship to legitimate public purpose); Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843,
859 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (declining to extend heightened or strict scrutiny to laws affecting
homeless); D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 827 F. Supp. 1558, 1563 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding
homeless are not suspect class for purpose of equal protection analysis); People v. Scott, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 183 n.9 (App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1993) (rejecting amici curiae argument
that homeless are "suspect class" entitled to protections of heightened scrutiny); People v.
Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 491 (App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1993) (finding beggars do not
constitute suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis).
178 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (striking down poll
tax). The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, appeared close to declaring
wealth a suspect classification by stating: "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property
render a classification highly suspect." Id.; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627
(1969) (invalidating one-year residency requirement as condition to receiving welfare bene-
fits); Griffin v. illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding state must provide indigent criminal
defendants free trial transcripts necessary to file appeal). But see Kadrmas v. Dickinson
Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988). The Court noted that it has repeatedly denied suspect
classification based on wealth alone. Id. The Court stated that "[w]e have previously re-jected the suggestion that statutes having different effects on the wealthy and the poor
should on that account alone be subjected to strict equal protection scrutiny." Id.
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dependent School District v. Rodriguez,17 9 the Supreme Court
firmly rejected the argument that classifications based on wealth
alone should be subject to strict scrutiny.' 80 However, Justice
Marshall's dissent raisedthe possibility of the application of inter-
mediate scrutiny to wealth classifications by voicing dissatisfac-
tion with the Court's denial of suspect status to the plaintiffs.'"
The homeless, as a subset of the poor, face many of the obstacles
which courts have identified as applying to classes that have been
afforded heightened scrutiny. 82 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that legislative classifications based upon immutable char-
acteristics often justify heightened levels of scrutiny.18 3 American
political and economic principles have traditionally supported the
prospect of infinite upward mobility.'8 4 Although class mobility
has been a reality throughout our nation's development,'8 - recent
studies indicate that people's chances of improving their socioeco-
179 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
180 See id. at 4-5. A class action suit was brought on behalf of schoolchildren who resided
in a property district distinctly poorer than other districts to challenge Texas's system of
financing public education based upon the property tax base. Id. The Court rejected the
plaintiff's arguments for strict scrutiny analysis and noted that it had never "held that
wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny." Id. at
29; cf supra note 178. The Warren Court cases which applied heightened levels of scrutiny
to laws burdening the poor also involved distinctions which constituted an infringement of
a constitutionally protected fundamental right. Id.
181 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall suggested a "sliding scale" approach to equal protection
analysis by stating:
I must once more voice my disagreement with the Court's rigidified approach to equal
protection analysis. The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protec-
tion cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of
review-strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field of
equal protection defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court
has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimina-
tion allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.
182 See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text (discussing factors considered by
courts in determining whether to grant suspect or quasi-suspect status to group).
183 See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972) (recognizing
that classifications based upon immutable traits are "contrary to the basic concept... that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing").
184 See Marc S. Gerber, Equal Protection, Public Choice Theory, and Learnfare: Wealth
Classifications Revisited, 81 GEo. L. J. 2141, 2161 (1993). The author noted that America
has enjoyed a history of opportunity and prosperous growth. Id. American political and
socioeconomic systems have ingrained upon the American consciousness the proposition
that upward mobility is a possibility. Id.
185 See id. The fact that people have moved up and down the socioeconomic ladder indi-
cated that class mobility is a reality. Id.; Ronald Brownstein, America's Anxiety Attack; the
Cold War Is Over, the Family Is Collapsing, the Economy Is Going Global and the Melting
Pot Is Boiling-When Everything's in Flux, What's a Nation To Do?, L.A. TIMES, May 8,
1994, (Magazine), at 14 (noting Americans have traditionally considered upward mobility a
birthright).
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nomic status have significantly diminished.'l 6 Accordingly, an in-
dividual's lack of control over access to wealth suggests that
wealth as a trait should be afforded immutable or quasi-immuta-
ble status.' 8 7
When a group's defining characteristic has a direct bearing on
the members' ability to function in or contribute to society, the
Court has declined to afford the class suspect or quasi-suspect sta-
tus. 88 Age and mental ability are characteristics that have been
found by the Supreme Court to bear a relationship to an individ-
ual's ability to perform, participate in, or contribute to society.'8 9
The changing composition of homelessness indicates that home-
lessness does not necessarily bear a relationship to one's ability to
function in society.' 9 ° Homelessness is increasingly the result of
factors which are not related to an individual's ability to perform
in society, such as adverse economic conditions, the lack of low-
income housing and affordable health care, and displacement by
186 See Gerber, supra note 184, at 2161. An Urban Institute study found that the
chances of an individual moving their income classification from the bottom 20% to the top
40% were 1 in 10. Id. Another study revealed that 75% of the 20-year-olds who started in
the bottom quintile remained there 30 years later and virtually none made it to the top
quintile. Id; see also Brownstein, supra note 185, at 14 (discussing how advancing technol-
ogy and integrating global markets are forcing companies to reexamine basic operations,
thereby undermining upward mobility of Americans); Jonathan Eig, Temporary Workers
Alter Face Of Business, Job-seekers Fear Trend; Firms Like It, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
June 5, 1994, at Al (noting growth in low-wage, temporary, and part time jobs represents
declining opportunities for upward mobility); Study By University of Michigan Confirms
Trends Toward Extremes in Financial Split, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 1, 1991, at A14. A
University of Michigan study disclosed the decreased possibilities of upward mobility
among the working poor. Id. The study noted that although the number of people who
moved up and out of the middle class in the 1980's was greater than those falling down and
out, the number of middle-income people falling to low-income status significantly in-
creased. Id. Throughout the 1980's, the division between rich and poor increased. Id.
187 See Gerber, supra note 184, at 2161-62. The author acknowledged that although
wealth has not been recognized as an immutable trait, the growing lack of upward mobility
indicates that wealth should be afforded quasi-immutable status. Id.
188 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (recognizing "sex character-
istic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society"); TRIBE,
supra note 36, § 16-33, at 1615 (discussing Supreme Court's finding that lack of group's
responsibility for its own defining characteristic is relevant in determination of heightened
scrutiny).
189 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (finding
mental disability bears "undeniable" relationship to one's ability to perform); Massachu-
setts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (declining to apply heightened
protection to police officers over the age of 50, because of relationship between increasing
age and physical ability).
190 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing factors contributing to
homelessness).
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natural disasters. 191 Thus, homelessness is not necessarily a char-
acteristic defining one's ability to contribute to society. 192
The homeless have suffered a history of purposeful governmen-
tal discrimination. 193 Courts have recognized that antihomeless
legislation represents continuing governmental hostility toward
the homeless. 194 Discriminatory actions against the homeless as a
group have ranged from government sanctioned arrest sweeps
and destruction of their property, 95 to incarceration without any
proof of the commission of a criminal act.' 96 Such purposeful dis-
crimination against the homeless as a group calls for providing
them with the protection of suspect or quasi-suspect status.197
Typically, homeless individuals lack a legal address, a place to
bathe, access to transportation or telephones, and often suffer
from poor health. 98 These factors make it difficult for the home-
191 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1558, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992). Per-
sons can be born into homelessness. Id. at 1558. Economic hard times may cause an indi-
vidual to lose their job or home. Id. at 1564. Natural disasters can destroy one's residence
and result in the individual becoming homeless. Id.; see also supra note 15 and accompany-
ing text (discussing factors beyond one's control which may cause homelessness).
192 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) The Court stated that,
"[i]ndigence ... is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color."
Id.; Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-93-773, 1994
WL 442746, at *16-19 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 1994). The court, in determining that sexual ori-
entation should be afforded quasi-suspect status held that sexual orientation has no bear-
ing upon an individual's ability to function in or contribute to society. Id.
193 See Simon, supra note 20, at 668-69 (discussing history of government hostility to-
wards the homeless dating back to 1600's).
194 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (recognizing
City of Miami's custom, policy, and practice of arresting, harassing, and interfering with
homeless people and their property constituted systematic effort to drive homeless from
Miami's environs); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 392 (Ct. App. 1994)
(discussing City of Santa Ana's program to rid community of homeless and their belongs
represented concerted, discriminatory efforts against homeless); see also supra notes 150-
55 and accompanying text (describing manifestations of government hostility noted by
Tobe court).
195 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1555-59 (noting City of Miami's practice of conducting
arrest sweeps of homeless, and seizing and destroying their property); Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 388-89 (discussing Santa Ana's policy of engaging in homeless "harassment sweeps,"
and of confiscating and destroying their personal property).
196 See Simon, supra note 20, at 669 (noting historically homeless have been jailed ab-
sent proof of their committing any criminal acts).
197 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (recognizing
whether group has been "subjected to history of purposeful unequal treatment" is factor to
be weighed in determining need for "extraordinary protection"); see also supra note 193 and
accompanying text (discussing purposeful discrimination as factor entering into Supreme
Court's analysis).
19s See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1557-58 (S.D. Fla. 1992). In its
findings of fact, the court discussed expert testimony establishing that the homeless are
plagued by chronic unemployment which is worsened by health maladies, and the lack of a
legal address, bathing facilities, transportation, and telephones. Id. Typically, a homeless
person's day is preoccupied with the struggle to obtain food and shelter. Id.
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less to obtain and keep a job. 199 Additionally, the lack of a legal
address and transportation make it virtually impossible for the
homeless to vote, rendering them politically powerless as a
group.2° ° An analysis of the foregoing factors suggests that home-
less people should be afforded heightened constitutional protec-
tions as a quasi-suspect class.2° '
CONCLUSION
As cities nationwide suffer from ever-increasing budget con-
straints, the issue of municipal liability should cause policymak-
ers to practice due care in implementing governmental interests
that are designed to improve the quality of life for all citizens.
There is no denying that city budgets are burdened by costs asso-
ciated with providing care for the homeless. However, increased
costs stemming from law enforcement efforts that proscribe inno-
cent conduct vital to the homeless and those resulting from judi-
cially imposed damages, which is also associated with costly litiga-
tion, are wasteful and unjustifiable. There is no denying that the
government has a legitimate interest in maintaining and preserv-
ing public areas for its citizens and visitors, however, "a minority
may not be entirely suppressed in the name of otherwise laudable
public purposes."20 2 Although the Supreme Court has declined to
extend strict scrutiny to classifications based upon wealth, the
Court has not expressly addressed whether intermediate scrutiny
would be applicable. Laws adversely impacting the homeless
should be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny. In order to
199 See id. at 1558 (recognizing that many homeless are chronically unemployed).
200 See Simon, supra note 20, at 668. In discussing discrimination against the homeless,
the author noted that "[tihe homeless are an increasingly unpopular, politically powerless
group who are readily identifiable by their dress and mode of life." Id.
201 See id. at 676 (concluding homeless must be afforded extraordinary protections by
courts based on history of discrimination and political powerlessness); see also Greg Vamos,
Comment, Kreimer v. Bureau of Police: Are the Homeless Ready for Suspect Classification?,
14 WHITTER L. REv. 731, 746 (1993) (arguing wealth-based distinctions and subordination
will continue unless homeless are afforded suspect classification). Factors such as the lack
of low-income housing, poor job opportunities, and high rate of substance abuse combine to
make the state of homelessness an involuntary one. Id. at 745. See generally Gerber, supra
note 184, at 2164. The author argued that intermediate scrutiny is the proper level of judi-
cial review to be applied in order to protect the poor from "invidious wealth classifications."
Id.
202 Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 395 (Ct. App. 1994).
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achieve the optimum quality of life for all, we must preserve the
guarantees provided for in the Constitution.
Christine L. Bella & David L. Lopez

